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In this paper, we examine the extent to which monetary policy should respond to movements in 
sectoral inflation rates.  To do this we construct a Generalised Taylor model that takes specific account 
of the sectoral make-up of the consumer price index (CPI).  We calibrate the model for each sector 
using the UK CPI microdata.  We find that a policy rule that allows for different responses to inflation 
in different sectors outperforms a rule which just targets aggregate CPI, as does a rule that responds 
only to non food and energy inflation.  However, we find that the optimal sectoral rule only leads to a 
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A key question for monetary policy makers is how to deal with ‘relative price’ shocks:  that is, 
movements in individual prices that do not reflect aggregate inflationary pressure but that can, as a 
result of nominal rigidities, lead to temporary changes in inflation.  As an example, in November 2017, 
inflation rose above 3% driven by increases in oil prices, combined with rises in the price of food and 
other imports resulting from the depreciation of sterling following the vote to leave the European 
Union.  The question as to how monetary policy should respond to these particular relative price 
shocks was discussed in Carney (2018) and the more general question of how monetary policy should 
respond to supply shocks (including relative price shocks) in Carney (2017).  In both cases, he argued 
that it was appropriate to adopt a policy that was more expansive than would be implied by a 
conventional Taylor rule, where the central bank would react to high inflation whatever the cause.   
 
This paper develops a framework to integrate sectoral shocks – which lead to relative price movements 
– into a model of the UK economy in order to examine more closely the implications of these shocks 
for inflation and the conduct of monetary policy.  More specifically, we seek to link together sectoral 
shocks in the consumer price index (CPI) data to the behaviour of the economy at the aggregate level.  
This will enable us to address several questions about the causal links between the aggregate and 
sectoral levels, though in this paper we concentrate on the practical policy issue of how monetary 
policy should respond to sectoral shocks.  There are several papers that model sectoral shocks in the 
United States including Mackowiak et al. (2009) and Boivin et al. (2009), and in the United Kingdom, 
including Ellis et al. (2009).  Boivin et al. (2009) find using US data that most of the fluctuations in 
monthly sectoral inflation rates are due to sector-specific factors.  Ellis et al. (2009) arrive at a similar 
result using quarterly data.  In addition, they find that while sectoral inflation fluctuations are 
persistent in the raw data, this persistence is due to common macro components and not to the sector 
specific disturbances.  The sector-specific shocks themselves are much less persistent.  Therefore, the 





specific shocks, but respond sluggishly to aggregate macro shocks, such as monetary policy.  As 
argued by Mackowiak et al. (2009), this could be due to the fact that firms focus mainly on what is 
going on in their sector, and pay rationally little attention to the macro factors.   
 
The key innovation of this paper is to link the 12 CPI Classification Of Individual Consumption by 
Purpose (COICOP) sectors directly into a New Keynesian Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium 
(DSGE) model of the UK economy.  We achieve this by using the UK CPI microdata for the period 
1996-2006 to calibrate a Generalized Taylor (GT) Economy for each of the 12 COICOP sectors.  To 
do this we estimate the cross-sectional distribution of durations within each CPI sector using the 
Hazard function as in Dixon and Le Bihan (2012).   Thus, for each CPI sector we have the proportion 
of prices in that sector that have a duration of up to one month, one to two months and so on.  This can 
then be represented by a 12-quarter GT model, which enables us to trace the effect of a shock in a 
particular CPI sector.  The GT model of pricing is then embedded into the macroeconomic model.  The 
United Kingdom is a much more open economy than the United States.  To capture the openness of the 
United Kingdom, we have used a version of the model of Harrison et al. (2011) and Millard (2011).  
Furthermore, we are able to separate food and energy out of the CPI sectors:  these are both sectors 
where prices are largely determined outside the United Kingdom and have had a significant impact on 
inflation in specific periods. 
 
The policy issue on which we focus is how monetary policy should respond to sectoral shocks.  We 
find that a policy rule allowing for different responses to inflation in different sectors outperforms a 
rule targeting only aggregate CPI, as does a rule responding only to non-food and energy inflation.   
In this paper, we look at two measures:  one that strips out the most volatile components of CPI 
inflation from the index and a second that strips out that part of CPI inflation that can be thought of as 
being ‘external’ to the United Kingdom, leaving only ‘domestically-generated inflation’ (DGI).  
Eusepi et al. (2011) show that targeting a particular measure of core inflation approximates quite well 





explain to the general public.  Aoki (2001) shows that a policy of targeting DGI is optimal in an open-
economy context.  Our approach is similar to his but our model is more general.  In particular, in his 
model CPI was an aggregate of ‘sticky’ domestic prices and ‘flexible’ import prices;  ie, imports were 
assumed to be ‘final goods’.  As a result, ‘core’ and ‘DGI’ inflation were equivalent.  In our model, 
imports are both final goods and inputs into domestic production, removing the link between the prices 
of domestically-produced goods and the domestic component of inflation.  In addition, we have 
multiple sectors with different degrees of price stickiness, which Kara (2010) showed overturned 
Aoki’s result that you should always target the stickiest sector. 
 
In our model, we look at simple rules in which the central bank alters interest rates in response to 
movements in aggregate and sectoral inflation rates and output relative to its trend.  Although our 
approach is similar to that of Eusepi et al. (2011) and Aoki (2001), there are some differences, which 
we feel means our approach adds to this literature.  In particular, we follow Aoki in using an open-
economy model whereas Eusepi et al. used a closed-economy model;  this distinction is likely to be 
important in the UK context given how open the UK economy is.  We have a more complete and 
realistic input-output structure in our model than both Aoki and Eusepi et al.;  again, we think it is 
particularly important to model this given the impact of movements in world energy, intermediates and 
food price inflation on UK CPI inflation over the past few years and we do not think it immediately 
obvious that the results of Aoki will go through in this more realistic setting.  And finally, we model 
each of the 12 NFE COICOP sectors as GT economies whereas Eusepi et al. use a single measure of 
price stickiness for each sector and Aoki lumps all the domestic producers together in one ‘sticky-
price’ sector.  Again, we think it is instructive to examine whether the results of Aoki and Eusepi et al. 
go through in our more realistic setting. 
 
Our results support the view that since aggregate CPI inflation is simply an arithmetic average of 
sectoral inflation rates, it must be better to allow policy to respond directly to each sectoral inflation 





than optimizing over a linear combination such as the arithmetic average.  In that vein, Eusepi et al. 
(2011) construct what they call a ‘Cost-of-nominal-distortions index’ (CONDI) that weights different 
sectoral inflation rates in such a way as to minimise the welfare costs of price stickiness in each sector.  
They argue that stabilising this price index is near optimal.  Of course, the practical policy issue is 
whether the improvement is significant or not, particularly given how hard it would be to explain such 
a target.  Kara (2010) found the improvement to be quite small in a simple model calibrated using US 
data. 
 
The paper is structured as follows.  In the next section, we carry out an empirical analysis of sector-
specific shocks in the United Kingdom using the approach of Ellis et al. (2009).  Given these empirical 
results, we then construct a theoretical model in Section 3 that can be used to think about the 
interaction of sectoral and aggregate shocks and sectoral and aggregate inflation.  Section 4 discusses 
how we calibrate the model and Section 5 presents some results that validate our use of the model.  
Section 6 analyses the implications for monetary policy and Section 7 concludes. 
 
2 Sector-specific shocks in the United Kingdom: An empirical analysis 
 
In this section we investigate the empirical properties of quarterly sectoral inflation in the UK over the 
period 1988-2017.   We disaggregate to the 12 COICOP sector level, with three additional sectors 
created by splitting COICOP 1 into Food (1.1) and Non-Alcoholic Beverages (1.2), splitting up 
COICOP 7 into Transport ex Fuels and Lubricants (7.1, 7.2.1, 7.2.3, 7.2.4 and 7.3) and Fuels and 
Lubricants (7.2.2) – henceforth Petrol – and also by splitting COICOP 4 into Housing and Water (4.1-
4.4) and Electricity, Gas and Other Fuels (4.5) – henceforth EGF.  We have split off Food, Petrol and 
EGF because the prices of these goods will more directly reflect potential external shocks coming 
from world food and energy prices than other COICOP categories.  Whilst the official CPI data broken 
down by the categories listed above only goes back to 1996, we have constructed data back to 1988 





first consider some stylised facts for this data.  Next, we estimate a dynamic factor model to 
decompose each sectoral inflation rate into a macro component and a sector-specific shock and analyse 
some of the key features of these shocks, which we use later to motivate our modelling approach.   
 
Table A shows the standard deviation, and first-order autocorrelation coefficients, of headline CPI 
inflation and the sectoral inflation rates, together with the average sectoral rate, in the columns headed 
‘Data’.  Headline CPI inflation is a weighted mean of the sectoral inflation rates, so the variance of 
headline inflation can be seen as a pooled variance.  Insofar as the sectoral inflation rates are 
uncorrelated with each other, we would expect the variance of sectoral inflation rates to be much larger 
than the variance of headline inflation and this is indeed what we find.  While the sectoral inflation 
rates are volatile, they are not very persistent.  We can see that only EGF, Clothing and footwear, Non-
Alcoholic Beverages and Recreation and Culture have half-lives extending beyond one quarter.  And 
we can also note that aggregate inflation is not that persistent with an AR(1) coefficient of only 0.53. 
 
While the raw data on sectoral inflation gives us some indication of what sectoral shocks might look 
like, it is not complete.  Some of the variation in sectoral inflation will come from common 
macroeconomic shocks, and some from sector-specific shocks, and we will want our theoretical model 
to match up with this.  Following Ellis et al. (2009), Boivin et al. (2009) and Bernanke et al. (2005), 
we use a dynamic factor model to decompose each sectoral inflation rate.  This approach uses a large 
dataset of economic indicators, including the sectoral inflation rates, and estimates a set of principal 
components which best summarise the information in that dataset.  These principal components, or 
common factors (Ct), are then regressed against the sectoral inflation rates (Xit) in order to estimate a 
set of factor loadings, Λ.  The sector-specific shocks are thus modelled as the residual in the equation: 
 






Our dataset comprised around 350 macroeconomic UK data series from 1997Q1 to 2017Q4.  This 
included inflation rates for the 15 sectors listed above, a range of aggregate and disaggregated activity 
measures such as GDP, consumption and industrial production, various price indicators including CPI, 
RPI and PPI, money and asset price data, and a number of variables that depend on external 
conditions, ensuring that the common components took into account the impact of foreign shocks, 
which are likely to be important for the United Kingdom.1  Where appropriate each series was 
seasonally adjusted, log-differenced to induce stationarity and normalised.  In this application we 
selected the first eight principal components to make up Ct;  however the results are not particularly 
sensitive to the number of principal components chosen. 
 
There are two key features of the estimated sector-specific shocks worth noting.  First, sector-specific 
shocks are more important in explaining sectoral inflation rates than macroeconomic (common) 
factors.  Table B shows the proportion of the variance of each sectoral inflation rate that can be 
explained by the common factors, in the column headed ‘Data’.  Whilst around 79% of the variance of 
headline CPI inflation can be explained by common factors, they only explain an average of around 
36% across the sectors.  However, there is heterogeneity across sectors:  in three sectors the common 
factors are more important.  Ellis et al. (2009) use the disaggregated consumption deflator rather than 
sectoral CPI series, and data from 1977 to 2006, but obtain similar results.  They find that around 81% 
of the variation in headline CPI can be explained by macroeconomic factors and an average of around 
50% across the disaggregated consumption deflator.  Boivin et al. (2009) use monthly US data from 
1976 to 2005 and find around 77% of the Personal Consumption Expenditure (PCE) can be explained 
by macroeconomic factors compared to around an average of 12% across the disaggregated PCE.   
 
Second, sector-specific shocks exhibit very little persistence and behave similar to ‘white noise’ 
processes.  In fact, it is the macroeconomic component that is generating most of the persistence found 
in the sectoral inflation rate.  Table C presents the sum of coefficients in estimated AR(4) models for 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________ 





the macroeconomic component and sector-specific shock for each sector.  In ten out of 15 sectors the 
sectoral shocks are white noise;  in the remaining five sectors there is statistical evidence of some 
autocorrelation, but only in Recreation and Culture do we find that the sector-specific shock is highly 
persistent.  These results are consistent with Ellis et al. (2009) and Boivin et al. (2009) who both also 
find that sector-specific shocks exhibit little or no persistence.   The macroeconomic factors on the 
other hand do generate significant persistence in some sectors (in nine sectors the sum of AR(4) 
coefficients exceeds 0.5), whilst in others they do not (in one sector there is no statistically significant 
macro induced persistence).  We use this stylised fact to justify assuming white-noise shocks in our 
model for all the non food and energy sectors apart from ‘Recreation and culture’ where we assume an 
AR(1) process.  We also use the estimated standard deviations for these shocks when we come to 
calibrate the standard deviations of the sectoral shocks within our model, adjusting the estimated 
standard deviations to account for the fact that they will be smaller than the standard deviations of the 
shocks given staggered price-setting. 
 
A critique of this methodology has been made by De Graeve and Walentin (2011), who argue that, 
although all sources of noise in equation (1) have been attributed to the sector-specific shock, in 
practice, some of this noise comes from ‘measurement error’ or sources such as sales and product 
substitutions occurring in the CPI data collection process.  Furthermore, these factors have little 
persistence.  Whilst sales are clearly important, it is not clear that we should ignore them when it 
comes to explaining inflation:  whilst individual sales might sometimes be ‘random’, the pattern and 
structure of sales forms an enduring part of pricing behaviour and we believe that they should not be 
edited out.   
 
3 The Theoretical Model 
 
In this section we briefly outline our model of the United Kingdom, which is based on Harrison et al. 





sectoral inflation rates and the appropriate monetary policy response to them.  In order to do this, we 
need a model in which there are a number of sectors and where the sectoral inflation rates of the model 
correspond in a meaningful way to the sectoral inflation rates that we observe in the real world. 
 
Given that Harrison et al. (2011) describe their model in full detail, in what follows we concentrate on 
those areas in which our model is different compared with theirs.2  There are two main differences.  
First, we model food consumption and production.  Specifically, in the model of Harrison et al. 
households consume utilities, petrol and non-energy;  in our model, they consume utilities, petrol, food 
and non food and energy (NFE).  To keep things relatively simple, we follow Catao and Chang (2010) 
and assume that all food is imported.  Second, we split NFE into 12 different goods, whose production 
differs only as a result of sector-specific productivity shocks and differences in the distribution of price 
stickiness across firms in each sector.  We use the Generalised Taylor (GT) model of Dixon and Kara 
(2010) to generate these distributions of price stickiness as we think that simply using the median or 
mean duration of price changes ignores the distribution of durations, which we argue may have an 
effect on how monetary policy should respond to inflation in particular sectors.  This contrasts both 
with the approach of Carvalho (2006), who uses only the overall distribution of price changes rather 
than 12 separate distributions, one per sector, and Aoki (2001) who has only two sectors, one with 
completely flexible prices and one with prices all sharing the same expected duration.  The result of 
these two alterations are that we are left with a model in which households consume 15 different 
goods, where these goods correspond to the 15 COICOP sectors we examined in Section 2, above.   
This means we can use the model to assess whether a central bank would want to set monetary policy 
with respect to sectoral inflation rates, where we can equate the sectors in our model with UK sectors 









As is the case in the Harrison et al. (2011) model, we assume that the domestic economy imports oil 
(which is combined with labour and capital to produce petrol), wholesale gas (which is combined with 
labour and capital to produce ‘utilities’, ie, what we denoted as EGF in Section 2), and other 
intermediate inputs (ie, non oil, gas and food imports).  These intermediates are combined with labour, 
capital, petrol and utilities to produce output of the 12 NFE consumption goods.  The capital stock is 
composed of NFE goods.  The demand side of the economy is more standard with consumption and 
investment being driven by real interest rates and the central bank setting the nominal interest rate 




As in Harrison et al. (2011), households maximise utility subject to a budget constraint.  They get 
utility out of consuming the bundle of 15 goods and leisure.  We assume that households own the 
capital stock and that they make decisions about capital accumulation and utilisation.  These 
assumptions, standard in the business cycle literature, are made in order to simplify the firms’ decision 
problem.  Aggregate consumption, c, is composed of consumption of food (which, as we said earlier, 
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We set the price of NFE to be our numeraire.  The aggregate price level (relative to the numeraire), p, 
is defined as the minimum amount of expenditure required to obtain one unit of consumption: 
 






Where pf is the price of food (relative to the numeraire), pu is the relative price of utilities and pp is the 
relative price of petrol.  Solving this minimisation problem gives the relative demand for each of the 
goods in terms of their relative prices. 
 
Unlike Harrison et al. (2011), we assume a perfectly-competitive spot labour market in which each 
household takes wages and prices as given.  So, real wages, w, will equal the marginal rate of 
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where h is total hours worked. 
 
3.2 Non food and energy producing firms 
 
The representative NFE producing firm uses labour, capital, intermediate imported goods, petrol and 
utilities to produce output.  The production function is described in Harrison et al. (2011), and so will 
not be repeated here.  The key point to note is that except for the sector-specific shocks, which we 
describe below, real marginal cost, , is common across all firms – ie, all firms in all the 12 sectors – 
producing NFE goods:  they all share the same technology and factor prices.  We do not attempt to 
construct a structural model of the NFE sector itself over and above the basic structure of the GT 
model, which can be thought of as ‘duration’ sectors superimposed on the CPI sectors within the NFE.   
    
We set up each of the COICOP sectors constituting the NFE sector as in the GT model of Dixon and 
Kara (2010).  Firms in each of the twelve NFE COICOP sectors are divided up into K ‘duration’ 





first note that the optimal flexible price in any subsector will simply be a (time-varying) mark-up over 
marginal cost in that subsector, where we assume that this mark-up is the same across the entire NFE 
sector and reflects monopolistic competition in that sector.   
 
We further assume that, after factors of production have already been allocated, the COICOP sectors 
experience shocks that will cause relative prices to move.  Real marginal cost within a COICOP sector 
will be given by 
ke
  where k is the relative shock in COICOP sector k.  (We can think of these 
shocks as temporary shocks to productivity or competitive pressure in sector k, which would 
temporarily affect the desired mark-up within that sector.)  Given our empirical results, we assume that 
these shocks are white noise, ie, 10, =+ jE jtkt , except in the case of Recreation and culture where 
we assume that the shock follows an AR(1) process.  Furthermore we assume that the shocks are 
uncorrelated across COICOP sectors.  Note that we are assuming that there are 12 sectoral shocks:  one 
per sector.  In effect, this is because we are looking at the shocks as relative to the NFE sector as a 
whole.  Clearly there is an adding up restriction, so there is no ‘sector wide’ NFE shock included in the 
model, as seems appropriate since we are treating NFE as the numeraire.  An alternative methodology 
would have been to include a sector-wide NFE shock and then allow for 12 sector-specific shocks that 
add up to zero (in effect 11 independent shocks).  These two approaches are of course linked:  we can 
think of the shocks 𝑘 in terms of the mean shock (the sector wide element) and the deviation from 
mean.  Conceptually, a technological improvement, or a change in competitive pressure, in Clothing 
and Footwear does not in itself imply that other sectors should get better or worse.  However, NFE as 
a whole will experience a technological improvement if the shocks across the COICOP sectors tend to 
be more positive than negative.   
 
Denote the price set by a firm in GT duration subsector k of COICOP sector z that is able to reset its 




























𝑖=1 = 0 (5) 
 
Where  denotes the inflation rate in the NFE sector and n is a production subsidy that ensures an 
efficient level of output in the steady state.  The real reset price, xz,k will be eroded by inflation (since it 
is the nominal price that is kept constant).  This is captured by the inflation terms in equation (5):  
higher expected future inflation will raise the real reset price.  Note that in the GT model, as in the 
simple Taylor model, when it sets its price the firm knows exactly how long the price will last.  Whilst 
some firms who expect their price to last for many periods will be far-sighted, firms who expect the 
price to last just one month will be myopic in their pricing decision.  This contrasts with the Calvo 
model, where firms face a distribution of probabilities over possible durations for their price, so have 
to be more forward looking on average when it comes to setting their price. 
 
Note that the sectoral shock tz ,  is not the same as the sectoral shock estimated in section 2.  The 
sectoral shock here can be regarded as how much the nominal price in the sector would respond if the 
price were perfectly flexible.  In the data, since prices are sticky in the NFE sectors, what we observe is 
a partial muted response.  The theoretical shocks in (5) need to be considerably larger in terms of 
variance in order to be consistent with the shocks we observe in the inflation data. 
 
Hence, the average price prevailing in GT subsector k of COICOP sector z (relative to the numeraire) 
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Whilst we have used the GT framework to allow us to model different levels of nominal rigidity across 
the COICOP sectors using the microdata, these sectors are otherwise identical except for the sector 
specific shocks.  Clearly, there will be substantial real differences between the sectors that we have not 
modelled:  eg, Hotels and Restaurants have a different technology and market structure to 
Communications.   These unmodelled factors might affect the inflation we observe in the data but not 
in the model simulations. 
 
3.3 Other firms 
 
As we said earlier, producers of NFE goods combine intermediate imports, petrol, utilities, labour and 
capital to produce their output.  Following Harrison et al. (2011), we first assume that ‘Value-added’ 
producers use labour, h, and capital, k, to produce value-added, V: 
 

































The capital effectively used in production depends on the intensity of capital utilisation, z, and a 
represents a shock to productivity. 
 
Petrol, qp, is produced using inputs of crude oil, Io, and value-added, Vp, according to a simple 






















min  (10) 
 
The motivation for this choice of production function is that it is not clear how adding more and more 
workers to a given amount of oil could physically increase the amount of petrol that can be produced 
from it.  Firms in this sector are also assumed to be monopolistically competitive and subject to 
nominal rigidities in their price-setting.  Following Calvo (1983), we assume that firms in this sector 
are able to optimally change their price in any given quarter with probability 1-p.  The resulting New 
















where p represents the inflation rate for petrol prices and p̂  denotes the log-deviation from the 
efficient steady state of real marginal cost in this sector, where we have assumed a production subsidy 
that ensures efficient steady-state output of petrol. 
 
Output of utilities, qu, is produced using inputs of gas, Ig, and value-added, Vu, again according to a 


























min  (12) 
 
Firms in this sector are again assumed to be monopolistically competitive and subject to nominal 
rigidities in their price-setting.  We assume that firms in this sector are able to optimally change their 
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where u represents the inflation rate for utility prices and u̂  denotes the log-deviation from the 
efficient steady state of real marginal cost in this sector, where we have assumed a production subsidy 
that ensures efficient steady-state output of utilities. 
 
3.3 Monetary and fiscal policy 
 
Monetary policy is assumed to follow a Taylor rule with the central bank responding to deviations of 
inflation from target and value-added from flexible-price value-added, defined as what value-added 
would be in an economy identical to the one we consider except that prices were completely flexible. 
 
The fiscal authority is assumed to buy only NFE and to have the same preferences across these goods 
and services as consumers.  It gives each of the firms a production subsidy in order to eliminate the 
welfare distortions resulting from monopolistic competition.  Finally, it raises revenue via lump-sum 
taxes on consumers. When the government’s budget constraint is combined with the households’ 

























where q is output of NFE goods, 𝑐𝑔𝑒
𝜀𝑔 denotes government spending with g being a government 
spending shock, and Xn denotes exports of NFE. 
 
3.4 Foreign sector 
 
We model the United Kingdom as a small open economy.  Following Harrison et al. (2011), we 
assume that there is an infinitely elastic supply of oil and gas on world markets available at exogenous 
world prices.  The domestic prices of oil and gas are determined by the law of one price.  Net trade in 
oil and gas will be determined as the difference between the demands for oil and gas and the United 
Kingdom’s exogenous endowments of each of these goods.  UK NFE exporters are assumed to face a 
downward-sloping demand curve for their goods, subject to an exogenous shock to world demand for 
NFE goods.  
 
UK food and NFE import prices, on the other hand, take time to adjust to purchasing power parity.  So, 




































































where f is the rate of inflation of food prices, m is the rate of inflation of NFE import prices, s 
denotes the real exchange rate, pm denotes import prices, 
fp
  is a shock to world food prices and 
mp
  is 




In this section, we briefly discuss how we calibrate our model.3  The idea is to calibrate the model so 
that it matches UK data in enough detail to allow us to provide a quantitative answer to the question of 
the extent to which monetary policy makers should respond to movements in sectoral inflation rates. 
 
When calibrating those parameters within our model that can be found in most standard 
macroeconomic models, we almost always followed the values used in Harrison et al. (2011) and so 
refer the interested reader to that paper for a complete discussion of where these values come from.4  
The only exceptions to this approach were the parameters governing the Taylor rule, where we used 





) = 1.5𝜋𝑐,𝑡 + 0.125(𝑦?̂? − 𝑦𝐹𝑃,?̂?) + 𝑖,𝑡 (17) 
 
When calibrating the process for imported price inflation, we followed Harrison et al. (2011).  For 
food inflation we simply assumed that there was no exogenous persistence and that food importers 
reset their prices every six months. 
 
We used the appropriate CPI weights (those applied in 2016 based on expenditure shares in 2015) to 
give us the weights of each of our sectors in consumption.  We set a number of other parameters so 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
3 Further details of the data used, and the calculations we made, to obtain our calibrated parameters can be found in the 
Online Technical Appendix. 





that, in steady state, the model would generate spending and input shares that match those found in the 
2015 Supply and Use Tables (SUTs).5 
 
In order to use the model to analyse how monetary policy should respond to movements in sectoral 
inflation rates, we need the model to match the stylised facts on sectoral inflation presented in Section 
2, as well as stylised facts about aggregate inflation and output.  In order to do this, we need to 
calibrate the processes driving the 19 exogenous shocks in our model:  aggregate productivity, 
monetary policy, government spending, the world prices of oil, gas, food, and intermediate imports 
and real marginal cost in each of the 12 NFE sectors.  The results reported in Table C in Section 2 
suggest that we can reasonably model 11 of the 12 sectoral shocks as white noise, with the exception 
being the shock to Recreation and culture.  We model this shock as an AR(1) process with an AR(1) 
coefficient equal to 0.63, the estimated first-order autocorrelation for the shock to Recreation and 
culture.  As we said earlier, the sectoral shocks of our model are not the same as the sectoral shocks 
estimated in section 2.  So, in calibrating the standard deviations of these shocks, we need to multiply 
up the standard deviations of the estimated sectoral inflation shocks coming from Equation (1) by 
scaling factors for each sector that depend on their relative stickiness.6  These scaling factors allow for 
the fact that prices in stickier sectors are less able to respond to shocks. 
 
Our remaining shocks were all assumed to follow AR(1) processes of the form: 
 
𝑡 = 𝜌 𝑡−1 + 𝜐𝑡 (18) 
 
where  is a white-noise process.  For the world shocks we used quarterly data from 1996 Q1 to 2016 
Q4 on world food prices, world oil prices, world gas prices and the world price of UK NFE imports.  
___________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
5 The equations governing the steady state of the model are laid out in the Online Technical Appendix and the implied 
parameters are shown there in Table A4.3. 
6 The calculation of these scaling factors is described in the Online Technical Appendix and our calibrated standard 





For the domestic shocks we used quarterly UK data from 1996 Q1 to 2016 Q4 on the nominal interest 
rate, CPI inflation, GDP, total hours worked, the capital stock, and real government consumption.7 
 
For the sectoral GT weights, we used an updated version of the data in Dixon and Tian (2017), 
adjusted for the splitting off of Fuel and lubricants from Transport, Utilities from Housing and water 
and Food from Food and Non-alcoholic beverages.  The sectoral GT weights are based on the cross-
sectional distributions of completed price-spell lengths, which are depicted in Chart 1.  The duration in 
quarters is on the horizontal axis.  The vertical axis is the proportion of prices in the sector which have 
that duration.  We have excluded education, since its spike at four quarters dominates too much.  Note 
that there is a local maximum at 12 quarters for most categories.  This is because all durations longer 
than 12 quarters are included in this.  The mean duration across the NFE sectors using CPI weights is 
4.35 quarters.   
 
As we can see, the share of ‘flexible’ prices (1 quarter duration) in each sector can be quite large.  
These prices will respond immediately to any shock in that sector.  However, in almost all sectors 
(with only the exception of Education), there is a long tail of prices which have a duration beyond two 
years.  Note that we have ‘split off’ flexible parts of the CPI from NFE:  Food from Food and Non-
Alcoholic Beverages, Fuels and lubricants from Transport, and Gas, Electricity and other Fuels from 
Housing and Water.  This accounts for the big reduction in the share of flexible prices in these three 
categories as compared to the results reported in Dixon and Tian (2017).  We can see that there is 
considerable heterogeneity across sectors.  The arithmetic mean durations vary quite a lot as well:  the 
longest are Housing and water, Health and Transport, with means of above five quarters and the 
lowest are Alcoholic Beverages (2.8 quarters) and Communications (3.13 quarters).  This heterogeneity 
is of course common in CPI data.  (See, for example, Bils et al. (2012).) 
 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
7 The Online Technical Appendix contains a description of the data used to calibrate these shock processes.  The first-order 





5 Model validation 
 
In this section, we solve and simulate our model and assess its ability to match the stylised facts about 
the inflation data presented in Section 2.  Table A reports the asymptotic standard deviations of 
aggregate and sectoral inflation given our model calibration and the first-order autocorrelation 
coefficient of quarterly aggregate and sectoral inflation rates as implied by the model and compares 
these with their data analogues.    
 
We first consider the implications of our model for the relative volatility and persistence of quarterly 
sectoral and aggregate inflation.  Recall that in the data, aggregate inflation was less volatile than 
inflation in almost all of our 15 sectors.  As can be seen, in the model aggregate inflation is less 
volatile than inflation in all 15 sectors.  The volatility of aggregate inflation is a little lower than in the 
data, whereas the average volatility of sectoral inflation rates more or less matches that in the data.  As 
in the data, aggregate inflation has some persistence in this model, whereas sectoral inflation rates 
have little or no persistence. 
 
Table B shows the proportion of variance in sectoral inflation rates that results from aggregate shocks 
– which, importantly, include shocks to the world prices of oil, gas and food as well as imported 
intermediates – and compares this with the proportion of UK sectoral inflation rates explained by the 
‘common factors’ we found in the UK data.  Leaving aside food, petrol and utilities, which are 
explained entirely by aggregate shocks to the world prices of food, oil and gas, respectively, Table B 
suggests that sectoral shocks are important in explaining inflation in all sectors. On average, they 
explain about 68% of variation in sectoral inflation in the model, similar to the roughly 64% of 
variation in sectoral inflation rates that they explain in the data.  In the model, about 87% of the 
variance of aggregate inflation results from aggregate shocks as opposed to about 79% in the data:  
both the model and data suggest that aggregate inflation volatility is predominantly driven by 






Finally, we examine the effects of a one percentage point monetary policy shock within our model on 
aggregate and sectoral inflation rates.  Our results are shown in Chart 2.  As can be seen, although 
aggregate inflation drops immediately, by around 0.3 percentage points, and then rises straight back to 
its steady-state rate, there is much heterogeneity among sectoral inflation rates.  In particular, the 
behaviour of inflation in the ‘education’ sector reflects the fact that some prices can change 
immediately but are then fixed for a year;  the result is that there is a drop in inflation in this sector of 
about 0.13 percentage points, which persists for a year, before the inflation rate in this sector bounces 
back to just above its steady-state rate.  For the other sectors, the more flexible ones in which a greater 
proportion of prices change every quarter – such as ‘alcohol and tobacco’ – see larger initial falls in 
inflation and the less flexible ones – such as ‘health’ and ‘education’ – see lower falls in inflation. 
 
6 Implications for monetary policy 
 
In this section, we investigate the implications of relative price shocks for optimal monetary policy.  In 
particular, we investigate whether monetary policy should respond to such shocks or should follow the 
approach of looking through them and responding only to aggregate shocks.  There are typically two 
approaches to optimal stabilisation policy in the literature.  One relies on computing the fully optimal 
‘Ramsey’ policy, the other relies on optimal simple rules (OSR).  Here, we use the OSR approach as 
OSRs have been shown to be robust and close to the optimal rules in many models.  (See, eg, Taylor 
and Williams (2011).) 
 
Before using dynare to numerically derive the optimal simple rule, we first derive a loss function for 
the central bank.  Here, we follow Rotemberg and Woodford (1998) and take a second-order 
approximation of the consumers’ utility function around the (non-stochastic) steady state.  However, 
unlike these, and subsequent, authors, we are unable to convert a loss function in terms of consumption 





that not all domestic output is consumed or exported, since the economy also produces capital and 
energy, used as an intermediate input, in our model. 
 
Now, the central bank’s goal is to maximise the unconditional expectation of the present discounted 
value of the representative consumer’s current and future streams of utility.  This is equivalent to 
























=  (19) 
 
We take a second order approximation of U around the steady state to get: 
 
𝑈𝑡 − 𝑈 ≈ 𝑐
−
1
















2).  So, expressing all terms 
as log-deviations from their steady state and dropping all terms of order 3 or higher gives us: 
 























Now, given our Taylor rule and the shocks in our model, monetary policy is neutral in the long-run and 
does not affect the unconditional expectation of consumption or hours.  To demonstrate this, note first 
that we consider only Taylor-rules that are stable and give a unique path to equilibrium.  We denote 
this set τ.  Any Taylor rule in this set τ will give rise to a unique set of impulse response functions 
(IRFs), that is, a solution for the endogenous variables conditional on a one-off shock to one of the 





state, but generate different IRFs.  Second, note that since the dynamics are linearized, they are 
symmetric and proportional, in the sense that the IRF for a shock of magnitude  is the same in 
absolute terms as the IRF for a shock -, but with the opposite sign.  The IRF gives the expected path 
of consumption and hours worked conditional on a particular realisation of the shock.  This will hold 
for each and every Taylor rule in τ.  
 
Now, the first-order effects of consumption and labour supply on welfare are (by definition) a linear 
function of the path of consumption.  Hence, the welfare effects of a shock  are exactly equal in 
absolute value but with the opposite sign for shock -.  And, the unconditional expectation is 
effectively the sum of all IRFs across all shocks, weighted by their probability.  Hence, for any shock 
that is symmetrically distributed around zero, the expected value of output is zero.  This can be 
interpreted, effectively, as meaning that if we have no information about the realisation of shocks, then 
the expected output in any period is zero (the steady state).     
 
These steps are really just a way of saying that the first-order welfare effect is zero, since the 
expectation of a linear function of consumption and hours worked is the welfare at the expected value 
of consumption and hours worked.  However, it is the combination of linear dynamics and the linearity 
of the first order effects which means that the expected value of (first order) welfare is exactly the 














The second order effects, however, do not cancel out.  Different Taylor rules will lead to different 





utility function captured by the second-order effect means that even though the IRFs of two shocks 
sum to zero, the sum of the welfare effects will be negative.  The unconditional expectation of second-
order welfare will therefore be negative. 
 
So, given the first-order terms in equation (21) disappear in the limit as T tends to infinity, we have: 
 























For this section of the paper, we shall use numerical methods to analyse different monetary policy 
rules in terms of which is optimal, ie, minimises the unconditional expectation of the deviations of 
utility from its (non-stochastic) steady-state value, given by equation (23), subject to the log-linearised 
equations that characterise our model. 
 










= −0.9334𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑐?̂?) − 2.0097𝑉𝑎𝑟(ℎ?̂?) (24) 
 
Where 
cU  is the steady-state marginal utility of consumption and we have followed Erceg et al. (2000) 
by scaling the welfare deviation by cUc  so as to express these welfare losses as a fraction of long-run 
equilibrium consumption. 
 
We consider the following simple policy rules, which differ in terms of the inflation variable: 
 






𝑖𝑡 − 𝑖 = 𝜃𝜋𝜋𝑡 + 𝜃𝑦𝑦?̂? (26) 
 
𝑖𝑡 − 𝑖 = 𝜃𝜋𝜋𝑡 + ∑ 𝜃𝑗𝜋𝑗,𝑡
15
𝑗=1 + 𝜃𝑦𝑦?̂? (27) 
 
𝑖𝑡 − 𝑖 = 𝜃𝜋𝜋𝑉,𝑡 + 𝜃𝑦𝑦?̂? (28) 
 
Equation (25) represents a standard Taylor rule, in which the central bank responds to aggregate CPI 
inflation and the deviation of value-added output from its steady-state value.  Equation (26) considers a 
Taylor rule in which the central bank responds to NFE inflation.  Equation (27) is similar, except that 
we allow the central bank to respond separately to inflation in each of our 15 COICOP sectors.  
Equation (28) considers a rule in which the central bank responds to the rate of inflation of the 
competitive price of value-added.   
 
These different rules enable us to focus on how monetary policy should respond to sectoral shocks.  
There are at least three possible views here.  The first, embodied in the CPI rule, is that policy should 
not respond directly to sectoral shocks at all but should just react to aggregate CPI inflation since 
sectoral price movements only matter indirectly through their effect on the aggregate inflation 
measure.  The second view is that since aggregate CPI inflation is simply a particular average of 
sectoral inflation rates (weighted by expenditure shares), it must be better to allow policy to respond 
directly to each sectoral inflation rate in an unconstrained manner. 
 
The third view, embodied in the ‘NFE’ and ‘value-added’ rules, is that monetary policy should 
concentrate on a measure of the underlying rate of inflation, ie, a measure of inflation that strips out 
the ‘noise’ induced by relative price movements and, so, provides information on the outlook for 





Such measures – sometimes referred to as measures of ‘core’ inflation – involve removing certain 
items from the CPI index or using statistical methods to try and extract the ‘persistent’ or underlying 
trend component, as discussed in Stock and Watson (2016).  We can think of our NFE rules as the 
central bank targeting ‘core’ inflation, where our definition of core inflation is based on excluding the 
most volatile components of CPI inflation from the index.  We can note that food inflation is much 
more volatile in our model than it is in the data, where excluding it would make less sense.  The 
competitive price of value-added in our model corresponds to ‘domestically-generated’ inflation 
(DGI), ie, the proportion of inflation that is unconnected to import prices and the exchange rate.  The 
argument for targeting DGI is that if inflation were rising (or falling) as a result of a one-off movement 
in the exchange rate leading to a temporary increase (decrease) in import price inflation, policy makers 
might want to ‘look through’ this rise (fall) when setting monetary policy.  That is, to achieve the 
target rate of inflation for CPI in the medium term without excess volatility in output, policymakers 
would do better to respond only to movements in DGI, since the difference between CPI inflation and 
DGI can show the extent to which movements in CPI inflation are being driven by import price 
inflation and the exchange rate.   
 
Our results are shown in Table .D  In order to gain intuition for the performance of our different rules, 
we report the volatilities of domestic output and inflation implied by each of our optimal simple rules.  
The rule in which the central bank responds differently to inflation rates in the different sectors 
outperforms the other rules (as it must), although the improvement is not as large as might have been 
expected:  14.6% relative to the Taylor rule, but only 0.0006% of Pareto optimal consumption relative 
to the Taylor rule.  These results are in line with both Eusepi et al. (2011) and Kara (2010).  Our 
results also suggest that a rule based on NFE inflation outperforms the Taylor rule by 7.2%.  The least 
good rule is that based on DGI;  the Taylor rule outperforms it by about 0.8%.  Again the differences 
between these rules in welfare space are all extremely small:  using a standard Taylor rule results in a 
welfare loss equivalent to only 0.0003% of steady-state consumption relative to the rule based on NFE 





volatility with more than half the weight on inflation, the rule taking account of all the sectoral 
inflation rates would perform worse than the standard Taylor rule and the rule based on NFE inflation 
as it results in much more inflation volatility. 
 
In order to understand the significance of the numbers in the optimal policy rules, we can express them 
in terms of the implied weights on each sector.  In the case of the standard Taylor rule, the implied 
weight on each sector is simply the Taylor coefficient on inflation (1.4578) times the CPI weight of 
that sector.  All of the implied sectoral weights are blown up by the same proportion:  since the CPI 
weights themselves add up to 1, the implied weights add up to 1.4578.  These implied weights are 
reported in the first column of Table E.  For the rule targeting NFE inflation, we put zero weight on 
three sectors (food, petrol and utilities) and adjust the CPI weights of the remaining sectors so that they 
add up to one:  they will still have the same relative values as in the simple Taylor rule.  The 
coefficient on the Taylor rule for NFE inflation is 1.4835.  These coefficients are in the second column 
of the table.  The third column gives the corresponding implied weights for the optimal sectoral rule.  
These are the sum of two things:  the coefficient on aggregate NFE (1.4823) times the sectoral weights 
in NFE, added to the coefficient on the sectoral inflation rate.  In the fourth column of Table E, we 
express the percentage deviation of the coefficients for the optimal sectoral rule from the implied 
coefficients for the simple Taylor rule. 
  
If we look at Table E, we can note that the sectoral rule implies putting less weight on all sectors 
except food, relative to the Taylor rule.  The big differences are for Non-alcoholic beverages, Health, 
Utilities and, especially, Education.  In fact, for Education the reduction is large enough to take the 
overall weight below zero.   Recall that the only difference between the NFE COICOP sectors is the 
distribution of durations.   But, contrary to the results of Eusepi et al. (2011), there is no evidence that 
the optimal sectoral rule is trying to target sectors with more fixed prices and put less weight on those 
with flexible prices.  The reason for this is possibly that whilst the proportions of price-durations in the 





as can be seen from Chart 3.  This illustrates the importance of modelling the entire distribution of 
price stickiness in each sector rather than using a single measure of price stickiness for each sector as 




In this paper, we have developed an open-economy model which allows us to sensibly explore the 
question of how sectoral shocks fit into the inflation story for the United Kingdom and how optimal 
monetary policy should deal with sectoral shocks.  The novelty of the paper lies in the fact that we 
model the COICOP components of the CPI as our ‘sectors’.  Furthermore, we use the CPI price 
microdata to directly calibrate the nominal rigidity within each sector using the Generalised Taylor 
model.   
 
We first examined the data on sectoral inflation rates and found that the sectoral rates have much 
bigger variances than aggregate CPI inflation, which can be seen as a pooled variance.  When we 
broke down the raw sectoral inflation shocks into sector-specific and aggregate components, we found 
that the persistence we observe in aggregate inflation comes mainly from the effect of the aggregate 
factors with sectoral shocks being white noise.   
 
Using our model, we analysed optimal simple monetary policy rules, where the central bank could 
respond to aggregate inflation, sectoral inflation rates, NFE inflation (CPI excluding the volatile 
elements of food and energy) and DGI.  We found that the optimal rule in which interest rates respond 
to sectoral inflation rates leads to an improvement over a rule in which interest rates only respond to 
aggregate inflation. The gain is large in relative terms, albeit small in small in absolute terms.  We 
further found that a rule based on NFE inflation also performed slightly better than a rule based on 
aggregate CPI inflation whereas a rule based on DGI performed slightly worse.  Although these results 





(2011) – our paper added to this literature by showing that those results went through in a more 
realistic – and so useful for actual policy makers – setting, something that was not guaranteed ahead of 
time.  In addition, this added realism enabled us to show that the relative weights on different NFE 
sectors were not necessarily tied to the mean duration of prices in those sectors – as in Eusepi et al. – 
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Table A % Standard deviations Inflation persistence. 
 Model Data Model Data 
Headline CPI 0.23 0.36 0.42 0.53 
Sector average 0.93 1.09 -0.02 0.38 
Food 1.58 1.08 0.28 0.45 
Non-Alcoholic Beverages 0.69 0.90 -0.30 0.55 
Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco 0.27 0.70 -0.25 0.31 
Clothing and Footwear* 0.75 1.05 -0.30 0.63 
Housing and Water 0.36 0.46 -0.07 0.41 
Electricity, Gas and Other Fuels 0.83 2.96 0.37 0.58 
Furniture, household equipment 
and maintenance 0.51 0.56 -0.20 0.44 
Health 0.29 0.35 0.08 -0.01 
Transport (ex Fuel and Lubricants) 0.47 0.74 -0.15 0.25 
Fuel and lubricants 4.07 3.78 0.17 0.29 
Communication 0.86 1.05 -0.32 0.46 
Recreation and Culture 0.28 0.40 0.30 0.56 
Education 2.28 1.68 0.00 0.08 
Restaurants and hotels 0.27 0.25 0.22 0.34 
Miscellaneous Goods and Services 0.41 0.45 -0.11 0.39 
 
Table B: Proportion of variance explained by aggregate shocks 
 Model Data 
Headline CPI 0.87 0.79 
Sector average (ex petrol, food and utilities) 0.32 0.36 
Food 1.00 0.54 
Non-Alcoholic Beverages 0.14 0.39 
Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco 0.23 0.30 
Clothing and Footwear* 0.16 0.54 
Housing and Water 0.34 0.29 
Electricity, Gas and Other Fuels 1.00 0.49 
Furniture, household equipment and maintenance 0.32 0.41 
Health 0.47 0.33 
Transport (ex Fuel and Lubricants) 0.20 0.33 
Fuel and lubricants 1.00 0.67 
Communication 0.11 0.30 
Recreation and Culture 0.85 0.17 
Education 0.01 0.09 
Restaurants and hotels 0.66 0.32 


































Headline CPI 0.56 - 
Sector average 0.52 0.16 
Food 0.84 - 
Non-Alcoholic Beverages 0.62  0.32  
Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco 0.48 - 
Clothing and Footwear* 0.58  0.28  
Housing and Water 0.40 - 
Electricity, Gas and Other Fuels 0.78  0.46  
Furniture, household equipment and maintenance 0.53 - 
Health - - 
Transport (ex Fuel and Lubricants) 0.62 - 
Fuel and lubricants 0.49 - 
Communication 0.48  0.31  
Recreation and Culture 0.57  0.96  
Education 0.42  -    
Restaurants and hotels 0.27  -    
Miscellaneous Goods and Services 0.70  -    
* The 2010 price collection methodology change is likely to affect 






Table D:  Optimal simple rules 
 Standard Taylor rule Policy responding to 
sectoral inflation rates 
Policy responding to 
NFE inflation 
Policy responding to 
DGI 
 1.4578 1.4823 1.4835 1.5036 
y 0.0284 0.0124 0.0195 -0.0053 
Non alcoholic beverages - -0.0140 - - 
Alcohol and tobacco - -0.0103 - - 
Clothing and footwear - -0.0158 - - 
Housing and water - -0.0194 - - 
Household goods - -0.0137 - - 
Health - -0.0200 - - 
Transport (ex petrol) - -0.0213 - - 
Communication - -0.0127 - - 
Recreation and culture - -0.0140 - - 
Restaurants and hotels - -0.0167 - - 
Miscellaneous - -0.0170 - - 
Education - -0.0557 - - 
Petrol - -0.0053 - - 
Utilities - -0.0216 - - 
Food - 0.0353 - - 
Standard deviations 
(per cent) 
    
Consumption 0.52 0.50 0.54 0.60 
Total hours 0.25 0.21 0.20 0.14 
Value-added output 0.73 0.72 0.73 0.86 
CPI inflation 0.27 0.33 0.31 0.34 
Loss 3.7750*10-5 3.2240*10-5 3.5041*10-5 3.8066*10-5 
Improvement 
relative to Taylor 
rule benchmark 







Table E:  Sectoral and aggregate effects.  
CPI NFE Sectoral %(3-1)/1 Mean Mode 
  
 
   
 
Non-alcoholic beverages 0.0175 0.0211 0.0038 -78.332 4.02 1 
Alcohol and tobacco 0.0612 0.0740 0.0520 -15.078 2.81 1 
Clothing and footwear 0.1034 0.1251 0.0894 -13.519 3.33 1 
Housing and water 0.1238 0.1498 0.1066 -13.911 5.21 1 
Furniture, household equipment and maintenance 0.0859 0.1040 0.0738 -14.183 3.71 1 
Health 0.0408 0.0493 0.0215 -47.277 5.57 1 
Transport excluding fuels and lubricants 0.1763 0.2132 0.1581 -10.327 5.12 2 
Communication 0.0466 0.0564 0.0347 -25.487 3.13 1 
Recreation and culture 0.2156 0.2608 0.2054 -4.736 4.08 1 
Education 0.0364 0.0440 -0.0186 -151.191 4.00 4 
Restaurants and hotels 0.1792 0.2167 0.1656 -7.563 4.74 1 
Miscellaneous goods and services 
0.1398 0.1691 0.1253 -10.399 4.51 1 
Food 0.1326 0 0.1702 28.387   
Electricity, gas and other fuels (utilities) 
0.0510 0 0.0303 -40.608   
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Chart 2:  Effect of a monetary policy shock on 







Appendix 1:  Derivation of the model and complete equation listing 
 




The representative household consumes four final goods and supplies labour to the firms.  It is also 
assumed to own the capital stock and make decisions about capital accumulation and utilisation.  This 
assumption, now standard in the business cycle literature, is done in order to simplify the firms’ 
decision problem.  The representative household’s problem is then to maximise utility subject to their 




















































































































































Where c denotes consumption, h denotes total hours worked, b denotes (end-of-period) holdings of 
domestic government bonds (expressed in units of NFE goods, which we use as the numeraire), bf 
denotes (end-of-period) holdings of foreign government bonds (expressed in units of NFE goods), kj 
denotes the representative household’s (end-of-period) capital stock, and k is the economy-wide capital 
stock (in equilibrium, equal to kj), i is the domestic nominal interest rate,  is the rate of inflation of 
NFE goods, if is the foreign nominal interest rate, z is capital utilisation (whose steady-state value is 
normalised to unity), w is the real wage (in units of NFE), wk is the real rental paid on capital, p is the 
consumer price index (price of aggregate consumption relative to the price of NFE), po is the relative 
(to NFE) price of oil, pg is the relative (to NFE) price of gas, O  is the economy’s fixed endowment of 
oil, G  is the economy’s fixed endowment of gas,  is total corporate sector profits (returned to the 
households lump sum) and T is a lump sum transfer from the government to the household sector. 
 


























































  (A4) 
 



































, ensures that the net foreign asset position of the economy 
is pinned down, thus closing the open-economy model by ensuring that the model has a steady-state 
solution (in this case with zero net foreign assets).  Further, we assume, without loss of generality, that 
the supply of domestic government bonds is zero in all periods;  that is, the government balances its 
budget via the lump-sum transfer, T, on consumers. 
 
Aggregate consumption is composed of consumption of food (which is imported), cf, petrol, cp, 
utilities, cu, and ‘non food or energy’ (NFE), cn.  The consumption aggregator is given by: 
 



























The numeraire is NFE.  We define the consumer price index as the minimum level of expenditure 
required to obtain one unit of the consumption good.  That is, we solve the problem: 
 
Minimise 𝑝𝑐,𝑡𝑐𝑡 = 𝑐𝑛,𝑡 + 𝑝𝑝,𝑡𝑐𝑝,𝑡 + 𝑝𝑢,𝑡𝑐𝑢,𝑡 + 𝑝𝑓,𝑡𝑐𝑓,𝑡 (A8) 
 







The first-order conditions for this problem imply the following inverse demand functions for food, 
























































































Where pf is the price of food relative to NFE, pc is the price of the aggregate consumption good 
relative to NFE, pu is the price of utilities relative to NFE and pp is the price of petrol relative to the 
NFE numeraire. 
 
Non food and energy producing firms 
 
The representative NFE producing firm, firm j, say, is assumed to have the following production 
function for output q: 
 


























  (A12) 
 
Firm j’s output is produced from two intermediates: energy ej and a bundle of intermediate output, Bj, 
produced from value-added Vj, and intermediate imported goods, Mj according to the simple Cobb-









=  (A13) 
 
































On the assumption that prices are flexible, the cost minimisation problem for the representative NFE 
firm, firm j, will be: 
 
Minimise , , , , , , , , , ,vc t j t m t j t p t j p t u t j u tp V p M p I p I+ + +  
 
































































Solving this problem, and integrating over all NFE firms, implies the following demand curves for 
value-added, imports and energy: 
 




























































































where  is real marginal cost, pvc is the ‘competitive’ price of value-added (ie, the marginal cost of 
producing it) and pm is the price of imported intermediates.  Notice that since the production of NFE 
has constant returns to scale, average and marginal cost are equal. 
 
An important point to note is that except for the sector-specific shocks, which we describe below, real 
marginal cost, , is common across all firms in the NFE sector:  they all share the same technology and 
factor prices.  We do not attempt to construct a structural model of the NFE sector itself over and 
above the basic structure of the GT model, which can be thought of as ‘duration’ sectors superimposed 
on the CPI sectors within the NFE. 
 
As stated in the main text, we set up each of the COICOP sectors constituting the NFE sector as in the 
GT model of Dixon and Kara (2010).  Firms in each of the twelve NFE COICOP sectors are divided 
up into K ‘duration’ subsectors, where sub-subsector k= 1, … K, denotes those firms whose prices 
change every k periods.  We first note that the optimal flexible price in any sub-subsector will simply 
be a mark-up over marginal cost in that sub-subsector, where we assume that this mark-up is the same 
across the entire NFE sector and reflects monopolistic competition in that sector.   
 
We further assume that, after factors of production have already been allocated, the COICOP 
subsectors experience relative productivity shocks (that will cause relative prices to move).  Hence, 
marginal cost within a COICOP subsector will be given by ket
  where k is the relative productivity 





noise, ie, 10, =+ jE jtkt  and furthermore we also assume that they are uncorrelated across COICOP 
sectors.  Note that we are assuming that there are 12 sectoral productivity shocks:  one per sector.  In 
effect, this is because we are looking at the shocks as relative to the NFE sector as a whole.  Clearly 
there is an adding up restriction, so there is no ‘sector wide’ NFE productivity shock included in the 
model, as seems appropriate since we are treating NFE as the numeraire.  An alternative methodology 
would have been to have included a sector-wide NFE productivity shock and then allowed for 12 
sector-specific productivity shocks that added up to zero (in effect 11 independent shocks).  These two 
approaches are of course linked:  we can think of the shocks 𝑘 in terms of the mean productivity 
shock (the sector wide element) and the deviation form mean.  Conceptually, a technological 
improvement in Clothing and Footwear does not in itself imply that other sectors should get better or 
worse.  However, the NFE as a whole will experience a technological improvement if the shocks 
across the COICOP sectors tend to be more positive than negative.   
 
So, consider the profit maximisation problem for a firm that can reset its price in GTE subsector k of 
COICOP sector z.  We can write this problem as: 
 
Maximise 𝑞𝑧,𝑘,𝑡(𝑥𝑧,𝑘,𝑡(1 + 𝜏𝑛) − 𝜇𝑡𝑒













Subject to 10for  ,,,, −== +
−




Where xz,k is the firm’s reset price relative to the aggregate price of NFE and n is a production subsidy 
that ensures an efficient level of output in the steady state.  Once set, the firm’s price stays fixed for k 
periods (by definition) and so its price relative to the aggregate NFE price will be falling by the rate of 
NFE inflation, .   
 
























𝑖=1 = 0 (A18) 
 
This equation implicitly defines the optimal reset price at time t.  The optimal reset price equates the 
expected net present values of marginal cost with marginal revenue over the duration of the contract.  
The last term in brackets is the period t+i marginal revenue and marginal cost measured in period t 
prices.  The weights vary with period specific outputs and elasticity;  if these were constant, you could 







Hence, the average price prevailing in GT subsector k of COICOP sector z (relative to the numeraire) 


























































p  (A19) 
 





















tkzkztz pp    (A20) 
 

























Perfectly-competitive ‘value-added’ producers use labour and capital to produce value-added, V, 
according to the production function: 
 
































  (A22) 
 
The term in z shows that the capital effectively used in production depends on the intensity of capital 
utilisation and a represents a shock to productivity;  recall that capital utilisation is decided by the 
consumers so firms can only choose the total capital input, zk-1.  The representative firm’s problem is 
to choose capital and labour input so as to maximise its profit subject to this production function, 
where its profit will be given by: 
 
1,, −−− tttkttttvc kzwhwVp  
 


































Petrol, qp, is produced using inputs of crude oil, Io, and value-added, Vp.  We assume a simple 























min   
 
Cost minimisation implies: 
 
( ) tpqpto qI ,, 1 −=  (A25) 
 














=  (A27) 
 
Where po denotes the price of oil (relative to NFE) and p denotes real marginal cost in this sector. 
 
Petrol producers are assumed to operate in a monopolistically competitive market and face price 
rigidities a la Calvo (1983).  Specifically, they are able to optimally change their price in any given 
quarter with probability 1-p.  Now, each period those producers that can change their price will set it 
so as to maximise their expected profit subject to their demand curves and the fact that they may not be 
able to change their price for a long while.  The expected profit for a firm (say firm j) that can set its 
















Where pp,j is the price (relative to the numeraire, NFE) set by petrol producer j and p denotes a 
production subsidy, which offsets the distortion caused by monopolistic competition in the petrol 
sector. 
 













= 0 (A28) 
 













Taking a first-order Taylor series expansion of these two equations around a zero steady-state inflation 




















Utilities producers are exactly analogous to petrol producers.  Output of utilities, qu, is produced using 






















min   
 
Cost minimisation implies: 
 
( ) tuutg qI ,, 1 −=  (A29) 
 














=  (A31) 
 
Where pg denotes the price of wholesale gas (relative to NFE) and u denotes real marginal cost in this 
sector. 
 
Firms in this sector are again assumed to be monopolistically competitive and subject to nominal 
rigidities in their price-setting:  they are able to optimally change their price in any given quarter with 
probability 1-u.  Going through an analogous argument to that shown for the petrol sector, we can 













+= +  (A32) 
where u represents the inflation rate for utility prices and u̂  denotes the log-deviation from steady 
state of real marginal cost in this sector. 
 
Monetary and fiscal policy 
 
Monetary policy is assumed to follow a Taylor rule with the central bank responding to deviations of 









− 1) = 𝜃𝑟𝑔 (𝑖𝑡−1 − (
1
𝛽
− 1)) + (1 − 𝜃𝑟𝑔) (𝜃𝜋𝜋𝑐,𝑡 + 𝜃𝑦(𝑦?̂? − 𝑦𝐹𝑃,?̂?)) + 𝑖,𝑡 (A33) 
 
where i is a monetary policy shock.  Flexible-price value-added is defined as what value-added would 
be in a flexible-price version of the model given the estimated values of the shocks. 
 
The government is assumed to buy only NFE goods and to have the same preferences across these 
goods as consumers.  It collects lump-sum taxes from each of the firms in order to eliminate the 
welfare distortions resulting from monopolistic competition.  Any remaining budget shortfall is met 
via lump-sum taxes on consumers or budget surplus returned to consumers via lump-sum transfers.   
 






𝜀𝑔,𝑡 + 𝑇𝑡 − 𝜏𝑛𝑞 − 𝜏𝑝𝑞𝑝 − 𝜏𝑢𝑞𝑢 (A34) 
 
Where q, qp and qu denote the steady-state levels of output in the non food and energy, petrol and 
utilities sectors, respectively, cg denotes steady-state government spending and 





We assume that the United Kingdom is a small open economy.  Hence, world prices are exogenous.  























  is a shock to world oil prices and gp
  is a shock to world gas prices and we have 
normalised the steady-state world prices of oil and gas to unity. 
 
UK food and non food and energy import prices, on the other hand, take time to adjust to purchasing 































































  (A38) 
 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
8 The underlying assumption here is that UK importers of food and imported intermediate goods excluding food, oil and 





where f is the rate of inflation of food prices, m is the rate of inflation of non food and energy import 
prices, 
fp
  is a shock to world food prices and 
mp
  is a shock to the world price of our imports. 
 








Where x is captures the idea that foreign preferences exhibit a form of ‘habit formation’ and x




We close the model with the following market-clearing conditions (in addition to equations (A8) and 
(A34)): 
 
tptutnt VVVV ,,, ++=  (A40) 
 




tututu Icq ,,, +=  (A42) 
 
toto XIO ,, +=  (A43) 
 
tgtg XIG ,, +=  (A44) 
 


















Where Xn denotes exports of non food and energy.  We assume that the economy does not export food, 
petrol or utilities. 
 
Finally, combining the consumers’ and government’s budget constraints with the definition of profits 






















Where Xo denotes exports of oil, Xg denotes exports of natural gas. 
 





Appendix 2:  The efficient steady state 
 
In this annex, we first define the conditions under which a zero-inflation steady state is efficient and 
then show that we can obtain an efficient steady state in our decentralised economy by appropriately 
setting the various taxes and subsidies we introduced. 
 
Consider a social planner who maximises the households’ period utility function, subject to the 
aggregate resource constraint and market clearing in the housing and labour markets.  Note that since 
the cost of foreign bond holdings is assumed to be a deadweight loss, then in the efficient steady state, 
foreign bond holdings will be zero and the economy will run a zero trade balance.  Given that, we can 


























𝜎𝑒 + (1 − 𝜓𝑓 − 𝜓𝑛)𝜅𝑒 (𝜓𝑝𝑐𝑝
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 𝑐𝑛 + 𝑋𝑛 = 𝑞 = 𝑞(ℎ𝑛, 𝑘𝑛, 𝑀𝑛, 𝐼𝑝, 𝐼𝑢) 
 












𝑐𝑓 + 𝑝𝑚𝑀𝑛 = 𝑋𝑛 + 𝑝𝑂𝑋𝑜 + 𝑝𝐺𝑋𝐺 
 
Let n, p, u, f be the Lagrange multipliers on the non food and energy, petrol and utilities resource 






































































































= 𝑞′(𝐼𝑝) (B8) 
 
These equations imply the familiar conditions that the marginal rate of substitution between 
consumption of the non food and energy good and consumption of leisure, food, utilities and petrol is 
equal to the marginal rate of transformation between, respectively, labour, imports, utilities and petrol 
and output. 
 
We now show that by appropriate choices of taxes and subsidies we can achieve the efficient steady 
state in our decentralised economy.  In particular, we need to subsidise the producers of non food and 
energy, petrol and utilities in order to neutralise the inefficiencies resulting from monopolistic 
competition in each of these industries. 
 





𝜎𝑐 = 𝜆𝑛𝑝𝑐 (B9) 
 
𝜆𝑓 = 𝜆𝑛 (B10) 
 
𝜆𝑛𝑝𝑢 = 𝜆𝑢 (B11) 
 
𝜆𝑛𝑝𝑝 = 𝜆𝑝 (B12) 
 




𝜎ℎ = 𝜆𝑛𝜇𝑞′(ℎ𝑛) (B13) 
 
The steady-state version of equation (A18) implies: 
 









then steady-state real marginal cost, , will equal unity and equation (B13) will be equivalent to the 
efficiency condition given by equation (B5). 
 










That is, the efficiency condition (B6). 
 




= 𝑞′(𝐼𝑝) (B16) 
 
That is, the efficiency condition (B8). 
 




= 𝑞′(𝐼𝑢) (B17) 
 
That is, the efficiency condition (B7). 
 
Now, the steady-state versions of equations (A27) and (A28) imply: 
 
(𝜂𝑝 − 1)(1 + 𝜏𝑝) = 𝜂𝑝𝜇𝑝 (B18) 
 
So, if we set the production subsidy to firms in the petrol sector, p, equal to (
𝜂𝑝
𝜂𝑝−1
− 1), then steady-
state real marginal cost in this sector, p will equal unity.  Similarly, if we set the production subsidy to 
firms in the utilities sector, u, equal to (
𝜂𝑢
𝜂𝑢−1
− 1), then steady-state real marginal cost in this sector, 
u will equal unity. 
 
With these subsidies in place, we can now write out the complete equations for the steady state of our 
model.  We normalise all foreign prices, the CPI, TFP and total hours worked in steady state to all 
equal unity. 
 



















































  (B23) 



























































































































































































































𝑝𝑢 = 𝜓𝑢𝑝𝑣𝑐 + 1 − 𝜓𝑢 (B40) 
𝑞 = 𝑐𝑛 + 𝛿𝑘 + 𝑐𝑔 + 𝑋𝑛 (B41) 
𝑋𝑛 = 𝜅𝑥  (B42) 
pun VVVV ++=  (B43) 
PPP Icq +=  (B44) 
uuu Icq +=  (B45) 
OO XIO +=  (B46) 
GG XIG +=  (B47) 






Appendix 3:  The relationship between the sectoral shocks of the model  
and the estimated sectoral inflation shocks 
 
In section 2, we make an empirical estimate of the shocks to sectoral inflation under the assumption 
that the shocks are residuals once we have stripped out the macroeconomic factors.  The underlying 
sectoral shocks give rise to these observed inflation shocks.  However, the effect of the sectoral shocks 
on sectoral inflation will depend on the degree of nominal rigidity.  If prices are perfectly flexible, the 
sectoral price level and hence inflation will reflect these shocks fully.  If prices are completely fixed, 
then the sectoral shocks will not result in any inflation at all, as prices cannot vary. 
 
With a generalised Taylor (GT) economy, there is a simple relationship between the sectoral shocks 
and the resultant sectoral inflation shocks.  Let us consider sector k.  Within sector k there are a 
proportion of firms 𝛾𝑘1 who have flexible prices:  therefore from equation (20) the price they set at 
period t will fully reflect the sectoral shock 
tk , .  There is also a proportion 𝛾𝑘1 who set prices for two 
periods.  Half of these will reset their price in period t.  Since the expected shock in the next period is 0 
(𝐸𝑡 , 1k t + =0) it follows that (ignoring discounting) their current reset price will reflect only half of the 
sectoral shock.  Similarly, for the proportion 𝛾𝑘𝑖 who set their prices for i periods, only a proportion 
𝑖−1 will reset their prices.  Since they expect all future shocks to be zero, their reset price will only be 
affected by 𝑖−1  of the current sectoral shock 
tk , .  Hence the response of prices in sector k to the 
sectoral shock is given by: 
 




i=1  (C1) 
 
With discounting, the appropriate formula is: 
  




i=1  (C2) 
 
Since the quarterly discount rate is 𝛽 =0.9925, discounting has little quantitative effect with the 
maximum price-spell of 12 quarters.  Hence, we can see that the sectoral shocks will in general be 
much larger than the corresponding sectoral inflation shocks.  So given our estimates of the size of the 
inflation shocks, we will need to scale up the size of the sectoral shocks: 
 
Using the GT coefficients for each sector, we obtain the appropriate scaling factor to two decimal 
places: 
 
Non-Alc bev. Alcohol Cloth&F H&W Furn Health Transport Comm Rec&Cult R&H Misc Average 
2.15 1.71 1.81 2.75 1.91 2.95 2.78 1.90 2.12 2.62 2.36 2.34 
2.17 1.72 1.82 2.79 1.92 2.99 2.82 1.92 2.14 2.65 2.38  
 
The figures in the first row are the scaling factors with discounting.  The second row gives the figures 
without discounting:  as we see, there is a very small quantitative effect if we approximate 𝛽 = 1. 
The average scaling factor in NFE is 4.25 (using CPI weights).  Education is missing from our data set.  
Given that we treat all price-spells as 4 quarters in Education this would indicate a scaling factor of 16, 






Appendix 4:  Calibration 
 
Table A4.1:  Standard parameter values 
Parameter Value Description 
 0.9925 Discount factor 
bf 0.001 Cost of adjusting portfolio of foreign bonds 
 0.013 Depreciation rate 
z 0.0206 Scales the effect of capital utilisation on the 
depreciation rate 
k 0.5 Degree of persistence in investment adjustment 
costs 
k 201 Inverse elasticity of investment adjustment costs 
z 0.56 Inverse elasticity of capital utilisation costs 
 20 Elasticity of demand in the NFE and petrol 
sectors 
u 2.25 Elasticity of demand in the utilities sector 
h 0.43 Inverse Frisch elasticity of labour supply 
c 0.66 Intertemporal elasticity of consumption 
e 0.4 Elasticity of substitution between non-energy 
and energy in consumption 
p 0.1 Elasticity of substitution between petrol and 
utilities in energy consumption 
v 0.5 Elasticity of substitution between labour and 
capital in value-added production 
q 0.15 Elasticity of substitution between energy and 
everything else in non-energyproduction 
v 0.25 Weight on capital in value-added production 
q 0.99 NFE production function coefficient 
u 0.67 Probability of resetting utility prices  
p 0.33 Probability of resetting petrol prices 
pm 0.6 Probability of resetting import prices 
pm 0.17 Indexation in import price setting 
pf 0.5 Probability of resetting food prices 
pf 0 Indexation in food price setting 
x 0.24 Persistence of export demand 
x 1.5 Elasticity of demand for exports 
 
Steady-state weights and shares  
 
Here, we discuss how we use data on the steady-state shares of various items in consumption and 
production to calibrate a number of parameters within our model.  To start, we use the appropriate CPI 
weights (those applied in 2016 based on expenditure shares in 2015) to give us the weights of each of 
our sectors in consumption.  These are shown in Table A4.2, below. 
 
We also need the weights of gas in utilities output and oil in petrol output.  From the 2015 Supply and 
Use Tables (SUTs), we can note that inputs of ‘oil and gas extraction’ into ‘electricity production and 
distribution and gas distribution’ were worth £18,529 million and into ‘coke ovens and refined 
petroleum products’ were worth £9,035 million.  The total output of these industries at basic prices 
was £104,955 million and £19,728 million, respectively.  This gives us shares of 0.1765 and 0.4580, 
respectively.  Total value-added of ‘oil and gas extraction’ at basic prices was £15,309 million.  This 
compares with gross value added at basic prices (GDP) for the whole economy of £1,684,937 million 





proportions of ‘oil’ and ‘gas’ equal the relative proportions used as inputs into ‘petrol’ and ‘utilities’, 
respectively, then we get shares of 0.0030 for ‘oil’ in GDP and 0.0061 for ‘gas’ in GDP. 
 
Table A4.2:  2016 CPI Weights 
Sector Weight (per cent) 
Non-alcoholic beverages 1.2 
Alcohol and tobacco 4.2 
Clothing and footwear 7.1 
Housing and water 8.5 
Furniture, household equipment and maintenance 5.9 
Health 2.8 
Transport excluding fuels and lubricants 12.1 
Communication 3.2 
Recreation and culture 14.8 
Education 2.5 
Restaurants and hotels 12.3 
Miscellaneous goods and services 9.6 
Food 9.1 
Electricity, gas and other fuels (utilities) 3.5 
Fuels and lubricants (petrol) 3.2 
 
We also need the weight of energy in NFE output.  We define ‘food’ as the sum of ‘Agriculture’, 
‘Fishing’, ‘Meat processing’, ‘Fish and fruit processing’, ‘Oils and fats’, ‘Dairy products’, ‘Grain 
milling and starch’, ‘Animal feed’, ‘Bakery’, and ‘Other food products’ in the SUTs.  Total final 
demand of the food sector (so defined) was £114,683 million in 2015.  Total final demand for all 
industries was £2,438,268 million.  From this, we take out total final demand for food, oil and gas 
extraction (£14,305 million), utilities (£30,074 million) and petrol (£41,264 million) to get total final 
demand at purchasers’ prices of the NFE sector of £2,237,942 million. 
 
Now, total intermediate demand for oil and gas extraction was £29,667 million.  Of this, the food 
sector used zero, and the oil and gas extraction sector used £696 million.  So, the weight of energy 
inputs into production of utilities, petrol and NFE will equal 0.0125.  Total intermediate demand for 
utilities was £80,413 million and for petrol was £36,588 million.  Of this, the food sector used £2,996 
million of utilities and £2,613 million of petrol;  the oil and gas extraction sector used £233 million of 
utilities and £116 million of petrol;  the utilities sector used £48,307 million of utilities and £807 
million of petrol;  and the petrol sector used £951 million of utilities and £3,080 million of petrol.  
Putting all this together, we get an input of utilities into NFE of £27,926 million and of petrol into NFE 
of £29,972 million.  So the shares are 0.0125 for utilities and 0.0134 for petrol.  The ratio of the two is 
then 1.0733.  We next calculate the share of NFE imports in NFE output.  Total imports of goods are 
services were £549,531 million in 2015.  Of these, £37,022 million were food, £19,697 million were 
oil and gas extraction, £19,276 million were petrol and £997 million were utilities.  So imports of NFE 
were £472,539 million.  So the share of NFE imports in NFE output was 21.11%.  Finally, the 2015 
SUTs suggest that final consumption of central and local government was equal to £362,062 and that 





to 16.18%.  Given these shares, we can then set our remaining parameters so that the model generates 
these shares in steady state.  The implied parameters are shown in Table A4.3, below. 
 
Table A4.3:  Parameter values set to match expenditure and cost shares 
Parameter Value Description Comment 
x 0.2440 Exports of non-energy Normalises the exchange rate, s, to equal 
unity in steady state 
c 1.3013 Scale parameter on consumption 
aggregator 
Normalises the relative price of 
consumption, pc, to equal unity in steady 
state 
h 1.6787 Relative utility of leisure Normalises total hours, h, to equal unity in 
steady state 
b 0.2167 Parameter governing share of non-
energy imports in non food and energy 
production 
Ensures that the steady-state share of non 
food and energy imports in non food and 
energy output is 22.29%. 
q 0.9907 Parameter governing share of energy in 
non food and energy production 
Ensures that the steady-state share of 
energy in non food and energy output is 
2.9%. 
e 0.0007 Parameter governing share of energy in 
consumption 
Ensures that the steady-state share of 
energy in consumption spending is 8.7%. 
n 0.4839 Parameter governing share of petrol in 
non food and energy production 
Ensures that the steady-state ratio of petrol 
to utility input in non food and energy 
output is 1.3682. 
p 0.1078 Parameter governing share of petrol in 
consumption 
Ensures that the steady-state share of petrol 
in consumption spending is 4.3%. 
qp 0.6698 Parameter governing share of oil in 
petrol production 
Ensures that the steady-state share of oil in 
petrol production is 0.7592. 
u 0.8888 Parameter governing share of gas in 
utility production 
Ensures that the steady-state share of gas in 
utility production is 0.3026. 
f 0.0037 Parameter governing share of food in 
consumption 
Ensures that the steady-state share of food 
in consumption spending is 10.3%. 
O  0.0021 Economy’s endowment of oil Ensures that the steady-state share of oil in 
GDP is 1.3%. 
G  0.0043 Economy’s endowment of gas Ensures that the steady-state share of gas in 
GDP is 1.4%. 
cg 0.1411 Government purchases of non food and 
energy 
Ensures that the steady-state share of 
government spending in non food and 




To calibrate the processes driving real marginal cost in each of the 12 NFE sectors, we first note that 
the results reported in Table C in Section 2 suggest that we can reasonably model 11 of the 12 sectoral 
shocks as white noise, with the exception being the shock to Recreation and culture.  We model this 
shock as an AR(1) process with an AR(1) coefficient equal to 0.63, the estimated first-order 
autocorrelation for the shock to Recreation and culture.  We then multiply up the standard deviations 
of the estimated sectoral inflation shocks coming from Equation (1) by the scaling factors for each 
sector that we derived in Appendix 3, above.  These scaling factors allow for the fact that prices in 
stickier sectors are less able to respond to shocks.  The resulting standard deviations for the sectoral 





























For the world shocks we used quarterly data from 1996 Q1 to 2016 Q4 on world food prices, world oil 
prices, world gas prices and the world price of UK NFE imports.  To construct a world price index for 
food, we multiplied the implicit price deflator for UK consumption of imported food, beverages and 
tobacco (BQAR/BPIA) by the sterling effective exchange rate index (ERI).  Similarly, to construct a 
world price index for UK imports excluding food and energy, we calculated an implicit price deflator 
in sterling by stripping out imports of food (BQAR for values, BPIA for volumes) and energy (BQAT 
for values, BPIC for volumes) from total imports (IKBI for values, IKBL for volumes), and then 
multiplied this deflator by the sterling ERI.  We then took logs and HP-filtered the resulting series.  
Finally we estimated AR(1) processes for the HP-Filtered series. 
 
We assumed the monetary policy shock was white noise.  Using quarterly UK data from 1996 Q1 to 
2016 Q4 for the nominal interest rate (AMIH), CPI inflation and GDP (ABMM), we constructed an 
implied series for the monetary policy shock based on equation (17).  Inflation and the interest rate 
were both demeaned and we used HP-filtered GDP as a measure of the output gap.  The standard 
deviation of this series was equal to 0.0018;  we use this value for the standard deviation of the 
monetary policy shock in our model. 
 
In a similar vein, we used quarterly UK data over the same time period on GDP, total hours worked 
(YBUS) and the capital stock to construct a time series for our productivity shock.9  Specifically, we 
used a version of equation (9) in which capacity utilisation was always at its steady state together with 
the calibration in Table A5.1 to obtain: 
 
𝑎,𝑡 = 𝑉?̂? − 0.75 (
𝑉
ℎ
) ℎ?̂? − 0.25 (
𝑉
𝑘
) 𝑘𝑡−1̂ (D1) 
 
In the steady state of our calibrated model 
𝑉
ℎ
= 1.1587 and 
𝑉
𝑘
= 0.5238.  Given these values, and HP-
filtered GDP, total hours worked and capital, we constructed a and estimated its AR(1) process. 
 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
9 For a description of how the capital services series we used was constructed see Oulton and Srinivasan (2003). 
Table A4.4: Standard deviations of sectoral 
shocks (per cent) 
Non-Alcoholic Beverages  1.51 
Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco 1.01 
Clothing and Footwear 1.29 
Housing and Water 1.07 
Furniture, household equipment and maintenance 0.82 
Health 0.83 
Transport (ex Fuel and Lubricants) 1.67 
Communication  1.67 
Recreation and Culture 0.21 
Education  25.60 
Restaurants and hotels 0.52 





Finally, to construct the government spending shock, we estimated an AR(1) model using HP-filtered 
real government consumption (NMRY), over the same time period. 
 
The estimated AR(1) coefficients and standard deviations of the driving processes are shown for each 
of these shocks in Table A4.5, below. 
 
Table A4.5 Estimated shock processes 
Shock AR(1) coefficient,  Standard deviation of the driving 
process,  
World food price 0.70 0.0398 
World crude oil price 0.75 0.1445 
World wholesale gas price 0.62 0.2161 
World NFE export price 0.84 0.0156 
Monetary policy shock 0.00 0.0018 
Productivity 0.72 0.0057 
Government spending 0.29 0.0089 
 
Estimating the sectoral hazard functions 
 
These are estimated using UK data from February 1996 to February 2018.  Specifically, we use an 
updated version of the data in Dixon and Tian (2017), adjusted for the splitting off of Fuel and 
lubricants from Transport, Utilities from Housing and water and Food from Food and Non-alcoholic 
beverages.  The ONS micro price data we use is described by Bunn and Ellis (2012).  The derivation 
of the 12x12 matrix of sectoral duration coefficients 𝛾𝑗𝑖 is based on the steady-state identities derived 
in Dixon (2012).  By averaging out over the ten years, issues such as seasonality will wash out.  
Following Dixon and Le Bihan (2012), we estimate the sectoral hazard rates excluding left-censored 
spells, and treating right-censored spells as price-changes.  The CPI data for education is not available 
from the ONS:  casual empiricism indicates that these prices are set annually, so we have set the share 
of four-quarter spells equal to one and the rest to zero. 
 
The estimated coefficients are shown in Table A4.6.  The modal duration is highlighted in yellow, the 
median duration is underlined and the arithmetic mean is in the bottom row.10  The mean duration 
across the NFE sectors using CPI weights is 4.35 quarters.  Two factors need to be noted:  first the 
NFE sector accounts for 81% of the CPI and the remaining 19% are mostly flexible prices, so that the 
mean duration across the entire CPI would be lower; second, the distribution is truncated at 12 quarters 
which reduces the mean.  Overall, the mean estimated by Dixon and Tian (2012) across all sectors 
excluding education is 10.9 months.   
 
The method used for estimating the hazard function is the non-parametric Kaplin-Meier method (KM).  
One of the main issues in applying the method to the data is how to deal with censored data.  It is best 
to think of the CPI data as a panel with attrition and replacement.  We can see the CPI categories as 
collections of rows spreading across the 120 months.  There are about 600 products and services 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
10 The median occurs within the duration specified.  Thus, duration i means the median duration is between i-1 and i, hence 





sampled, with about 100,000 observations per month: each product is sampled in a variety of locations 
and across different sellers in order to be ‘representative’. 
 












1 0.258538 0.364759 0.348084 0.158687 0.332254 0.141129 
2 0.164464 0.23835 0.216387 0.13578 0.175622 0.118738 
3 0.136859 0.173809 0.114029 0.123914 0.110584 0.115163 
4 0.123069 0.075701 0.085725 0.129873 0.093401 0.127984 
5 0.064396 0.036453 0.05174 0.071711 0.056067 0.071579 
6 0.050603 0.025364 0.041523 0.062403 0.049431 0.068069 
7 0.044919 0.020769 0.030003 0.056376 0.038479 0.058657 
8 0.036083 0.015377 0.028401 0.047687 0.03236 0.054727 
9 0.03048 0.009892 0.01777 0.030343 0.023007 0.034519 
10 0.019933 0.008122 0.014715 0.029691 0.018941 0.039368 
11 0.018816 0.008006 0.01147 0.029484 0.015815 0.029385 
12 0.051841 0.023397 0.040153 0.124051 0.054041 0.14068 
Mean 4.02 2.81 3.33 5.21 3.71 5.57 




and Hotels  
Miscellaneous 
1 0.13765 0.640577 0.0000 0.269477 0.172279 0.218706 
2 0.172243 0.132255 0.0000 0.169827 0.130765 0.157369 
3 0.130431 0.057103 0.0000 0.121293 0.137958 0.125223 
4 0.132647 0.034746 1.0000 0.118622 0.150232 0.123234 
5 0.053646 0.024914 0.0000 0.058508 0.084055 0.067948 
6 0.062459 0.024163 0.0000 0.052384 0.059117 0.056757 
7 0.057418 0.019847 0.0000 0.043088 0.055404 0.049628 
8 0.054172 0.016807 0.0000 0.036776 0.054482 0.045321 
9 0.025527 0.011325 0.0000 0.022754 0.033704 0.026843 
10 0.027099 0.011436 0.0000 0.022228 0.025119 0.025148 
11 0.028093 0.009692 0.0000 0.018752 0.024373 0.019332 
12 0.118616 0.017135 0.0000 0.06629 0.072515 0.084491 
Mean 5.12 3.13 4.00 4.08 4.74 4.51 
 
Within each CPI category there are sequences of price observations for each product.   These can be 
identified as consecutive observations of the price of a particular product at a particular location: this is 
called a trajectory.  The choice of products and locations reflects ONS policy, as does the length of 
trajectory, and both can be treated as an exogenous ‘act of God’.  Within each trajectory is a sequence 
of price-spells.  For the purpose of this study, we are looking at all price-spells including temporary 
sales.  There are four main types of price-spells in terms of censoring.  First there are spells which 
constitute a whole trajectory.  For example, there are some pharmaceutical products in the Health 
category which have the same price for all 10 years.  These are left and right censored:  we do not see 
when they begin or end.  Second, there is the first spell in a trajectory of two or more spells.  We see 





Thirdly, there is the last spell in the trajectory, which we observe starting and persisting, but not 
ending.  Fourthly, there are the rest of the price-spells which we see beginning, persisting, and ending.  
These are uncensored spells.   
 
There are different ways of treating censored data which can have a large impact on the results.  The 
‘classic’ KM method (developed for analysing the data of medical trials) is to exclude all left-censored 
spells, include all right censored data, and treat the end of a right censored data as a non-price-change.  
A price-spell ends with a price-change.  In the case of right-censored data, you do not observe that 
ending:  it just falls out of the data because the ONS stopped looking at it.  This treatment of right 
censored spells is not a good one in our context.  In effect, we know that for our purposes all price-
spells end at 12 quarters.  In terms of the steady-state identities, not registering a price-change when 
the ONS stops looking at it means that implicitly the price-spell extends to 12 quarters.   The price has 
to change sometime and the classic KM treatment will lead to an under-estimate of the hazard for each 
period. 
 
Censoring can only reduce the observed length of price-spells.  As a better alternative to the classic 
KM method, we make two other assumptions: 
 
(a) We exclude all censored data in estimating the hazard function.  This can be justified if we 
believe that the censored spells and uncensored spells have the same properties.  However, 
the nature of the process of observation means that longer spells are more likely to be 
censored.  This will mean that there is a downward bias in the mean length of spells. 
(b) Following Dixon and Le Bihan (2010), we can treat right-censoring as a price-change (‘loss 
is failure’ or LIF).  This is the opposite extreme to the classic KM assumption and will 
almost certainly result in an overestimate of the hazard. 
 
We have employed both methods and the results are quantitatively similar, so we followed (b).  We 
illustrate the differences with two estimated hazards at the end of this section.   
 
This gives us the hazard function for each COICOP sector j for months τ = 1…35 h(j,τ) with h(j,36)=1.  
Following the steady-state identities outlined in Dixon (2012).  The survival rate for period τ is defined 
as the proportion of spells surviving to the end of period τ.  By definition, S(1) = 1 (no price spell is 
observed to last less than one month).  We then define: 
 
𝑆(𝜏) = ∏ (1 − ℎ(𝑗, 𝑖)𝜏−1𝑖=1 ) (D2) 
 
The corresponding monthly cross-sectional distribution (distribution across firms) is then defined by 
the steady-state relationship: 
 
𝛾𝑗𝜏 = 𝜏. ℎ(𝑗, 𝑡). 𝑆(𝜏). ℎ̅ (D3) 
 
where ℎ̅(𝑗) = 1/(∑ 𝑆(𝜏)36𝑘=1 ).  The corresponding quarterly distribution is then obtained by adding up 
the three months in that quarter.  This yields the 12-vector 𝛾𝑗 = (𝛾𝑗𝑖)𝑖=1…12
. 
 
 
